From the Fringes: Regulating Political Dynasties

From the Fringes: Regulating Political Dynasties

By Jerome Aning | October 16, 2026

“What do all men with power want? More power,” the Oracle, played by the late Gloria Foster, told Keanu Reeves’ Neo in their iconic courtyard bench dialogue in “The Matrix Reloaded”, released way back in 2003. This was my favorite line in the movie as the Oracle’s wry comment, for me, perfectly encapsulates the inevitable, self-perpetuating nature of political power.  By that time, I had already several many local government units (LGUs) in Metro Manila that have been dominated by political dynasties for years and I was beginning to doubt if people really wanted themselves and their descendants to be governed by members of the same family forever.

Continuing the discussion in my previous column on the Supreme Court’s recent decision on the constitutional provision against political dynasties, let us recall that the framers of our Constitution mandated Congress to craft a law that will meaningfully and substantially curb the concentration of political power to a few families in a country whose democratic institutions were still recovering from decades of strongman rule. The framers, as aptly pointed out by the high court, recognized that political dynasties have “distorted democracy, weakened accountability, and fostered conditions conducive to corruption and political patronage.”

The House of Representatives has already passed on third reading a bill prohibiting political dynasties while the Senate is about to do the same, after which both versions would have to reconciled and the resulting final draft approved by both chambers. The bills limit political dynasty to spouses and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity.  The House version prohibits such spouses and relatives from 1) simultaneously running for or holding elective positions in the same national, provincial, city, municipal or barangay government, or 2) seeking House seats within the same legislative district.  The Senate bill additionally covers relatives running under different or the same party-list groups. It also prohibits the spouse or relative of an incumbent elective official from succeeding to the latter’s position.

Several cause-oriented groups have expressed dissatisfaction over the bills.  There are those pushing for the prohibition expanded up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.  Others want members of a political family banned from seeking office even in different provinces.  Based on my reading of the bills, however, at least two infuriating practices of political dynasties will, hopefully, be eliminated:  the swapping of positions during elections and the fielding of scions, first to lower positions and then to higher ones as they grow older or more politically experienced.

An anti-dynasty law would essentially result in the diminution of political power not only in the Congress but also in the Executive Branch as well as in LGUs.  So can be it said that Oracle is wrong, because people with power—the political dynasties—could also, willingly, be compelled to give up power?

The Supreme Court, in declaring that the Congress committed grave abuse of discretion for its continuing failure to pass an an anti-dynasty law, noted that delay has already allowed the entrenchment of political dynasties to persist.  If political dynasties remain entrenched, including in the halls of Congress, can we really expect them to back a law designed to prohibit them?  This made me wonder whether a law implementing the provision, as contemplated by the authors of the Constitution, would be enacted at all by Congress.

As a journalist, I found the discussions on the anti-dynasty law focused far too much on the prohibition aspect. Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, as intended by its authors, left it to Congress to define first what a political dynasty is, then prohibit it.  However, as I pointed out in my previous column, the very act of defining a political dynasty necessarily includes when, where and how it should be prohibited. The proposed anti-dynasty laws pending before the House and the Senate do not prohibit political dynasties per se; rather, the bills regulate political dynasties. The Constitution bestowed regulatory, not prohibitory, power on Congress. It is hoped that through regulation, the political dynasties will, slowly but surely, be “dis-entrenched”.

As in any legislature, horse-trading or backroom negotiations will determine the final version of the anti-dynasty law. The reality is that political dynasties continue to dominate the halls of Congress, so there is a danger that we could get a watered-down anti-dynasty law. The Oracle might be right all along. The bicameral conference committee, if it wants, can change the scope, extent or geographical coverage of a political dynasty that will be subject to prohibition.  Who knows, the body might even adopt the proposal in the ongoing Dapat Isa Lang people’s initiative drive which limits members of a political dynasty to just one national and one local elective position each.

Prohibiting or regulating political dynasties will also be an empty gesture if ordinary people, especially the young and the not-so-rich, would not be able to run for public office due to the high cost of an election campaign.  To re-state, Article II, Section 26 provides, “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” If the state is to guarantee equal access to public service, including elective offices, the next and immediate step after passing an anti-dynasty law would be to reform our electoral system and our political practices to make opportunities for public service accessible to all. Utilizing “guns, goons and gold”, long-time and well-entrenched dynasts could easily field proteges, puppets or stooges to run for office and, if successful, serve as seat-warmers until the next election when their patrons can run again. In many LGUs, we have already seen patriarchs and matriarchs of political families who no longer seek public office and have seemingly taken upon the more thrilling career of a king-maker or power behind the throne.

In my previous column I mentioned that some proponents of the anti-dynasty law have considered including appointive positions as well in the prohibition.  An anti-dynasty law will also be meaningless if appointive positions, particularly the high-ranking ones, will remain accessible to members of political dynasties.  Again, we have seen dynasts, who, after relinquishing their local election offices, get appointed to positions like administrator, council secretary, prosecutor or even government consultant, and continuing to exert political influence in their old turfs.

Whatever the final version of the anti-dynasty law will be, it’s a good start in stopping those with power from accumulating more power. Some would say that it is better to have anti-dynasty law, however imperfect, than to have none at all.  We, the electorate, should test the law’s merits, seek further improvements and, if warranted, question its implementation before the courts. We must sustain the public discourse on prohibiting political dynasties as well as the need for systemic reforms in our electoral processes and political practices to equalize access to opportunities for public service if we want to make our democracy really work.

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